​​Sovereign Imperial & Royal House of Ghassan

Arab Royal Laws of Succession:
A Comparative Overview of Europe and the Middle East

Royal laws of succession vary significantly across different nations, with each monarchy adapting its own system based on tradition, history, and cultural norms. In Europe, the principle of primogeniture—where the firstborn child, historically male, inherits the throne—is commonly applied. Yet there are notable variations in succession laws even within Europe, a relatively homogeneous continent with deep familial ties between royal families.

European Succession Laws

One clear distinction in European monarchy systems is the application of Salic law in France, which has been in effect since the Franks (circa 500 CE). Under Salic law, women were excluded from inheriting thrones, fiefs, or other property. This succession system differs from the British model, where Queen Victoria and Queen Elizabeth II ascended the throne, which would not have been possible under French law.

Another notable example is the House of Savoy in Italy. According to its succession laws, royalty who entered into morganatic marriages—marriages between individuals of unequal social rank—were excluded from the line of succession. As a result, under the Italian system, neither King Felipe of Spain nor Prince William of Britain would be eligible to inherit the throne due to their marriages to commoners.

These laws demonstrate how succession in Europe is not uniform. As Professor Stephen P. Kerr y Baca points out in his essay, Resolution of Monarchical Successions under International Law, questions regarding royal succession are “primarily juridical and ought to be resolved through the correct application of each family’s Dynastic Laws” (The Augustan, Vol. XVII, p. 977).

Middle Eastern and Arab Monarchies

In contrast, the system of succession in the Middle East, particularly among Arab monarchies, operates under a different set of principles. Rather than strict primogeniture, Middle Eastern dynasties have historically used rotation systems, where succession is not automatically passed from father to eldest son but selected from eligible male family members. The decision is often based on physical strength, popularity, and noble lineage, particularly if the prince is descended from another royal line through his mother.

As Michael Herb explains, “Middle Eastern monarchical systems have established various methods of choosing which among the eligible princes will rule” (All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies, p. 27). This rotation system has its roots in pre-Islamic Arab tribal norms, where authority could pass laterally to brothers, uncles, or cousins rather than from father to son. According to scholar Joseph A. Kechichian, Sharia law also informs this flexibility, which recognizes all male descendants as legitimate heirs, regardless of the nature of their mothers' marriages (Succession in Saudi Arabia, 2001, p. 10).

The Ottoman Empire and Regional Variations

Other Middle Eastern monarchies, like the Ottoman Empire, implemented different rules. After 1617, the Ottomans adopted the principle that the eldest living male of the dynasty would succeed. However, this rule was not formalized legally (Alderson, The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty, pp. 12-13). However, the practice of fratricide—where the incoming sultan would murder his brothers to secure the throne—became a notorious feature of Ottoman succession.

In contrast to the flexible system of rotation practiced by most Arab dynasties, Bahrain is unique among Gulf monarchies for its fixed rule of succession, which specifies that the ruler's eldest son should succeed him (Herb, All in the Family, p. 132). Nevertheless, Bahrain’s constitution allows the ruler to appoint a different son as Crown Prince during his lifetime (Section 1, Article 1).

The Pros and Cons of Fixed and Flexible Succession

The flexibility of Middle Eastern succession systems allows rulers to choose successors based on merit, avoiding the potential pitfalls of primogeniture, where the eldest son may only sometimes be the best fit to rule. As Jean-Jacques Rousseau observed in The Social Contract, fixed systems of succession can lead to imbeciles or monsters on the throne, as the "lottery of birth" does not guarantee competent rulers (Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 63).

On the other hand, fixed succession systems like primogeniture can reduce the internal strife from competition among family members. In Europe, Montesquieu famously noted that a clear line of succession, governed by law, eliminates disputes and reduces the need for violent power struggles within royal families (The Spirit of Laws, Book V).

The Ghassanid Succession and Influence

The Ghassanid dynasty, which ruled parts of the Levant, followed a rotation system similar to that of other Arab monarchies, borrowing elements from Roman and Byzantine practices. Ghassanid rulers did not adhere to strict Salic law or follow agnatic primogeniture. Instead, the succession of rulers was based on the selection of the most qualified male descendant of the reigning monarch. The principle of co-rulership, adopted from the Byzantine Empire, was also a significant feature of Ghassanid succession.

The rotation system allowed brothers and cousins to take the throne, which is evident in the early history of the Ghassanids. From King Jafnah I ibn Amr in 220 CE to the last ruling monarch, King Jabalah VI ibn al-Aiham in 638 CE, succession was passed laterally and vertically among various family members. This flexibility mirrors the modern-day rotation systems still in use in monarchies like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

Conclusion

Succession laws in European and Middle Eastern monarchies highlight the diversity of royal traditions worldwide. While European systems generally favor primogeniture, Arab monarchies continue to use flexible systems based on tribal customs and merit. As demonstrated by the Ghassanid dynasty and others, these systems allow for the selection of rulers who are deemed most capable, though they also open the door to internal power struggles.

References

  • Herb, Michael. All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies. State University of New York Press, 1999.
  • Kerr y Baca, Stephen P. Resolution of Monarchical Successions under International Law. The Augustan, Vol. XVII, 1985.
  • Kechichian, Joseph A. Succession in Saudi Arabia. Palgrave Macmillan, 2001.
  • Alderson, A. D. The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty. Clarendon Press, 1956.
  • Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat. The Spirit of Laws. 1748.
  • Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract. 1762.